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INTRODUCTION
On August 27, 2015, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
the "Board") issued its long-awaited Browning-Ferris decision' (the
"decision" or "Browning-Ferris IF') clarifying the "joint-employer
standard ' 2 under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act").
The decision's majority purports to reaffirm the traditional joint-employer
standard enunciated by the Third Circuit in 1982 in NLRB v. Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Pa. ("Browning-Ferris ,).3 Browning-Ferris II's
dissenters, instead, view the decision as an unprecedented move by the
Board, announcing an entirely new standard. This division is not limited to
* Jay Forester is an Attorney at Lee & Braziel, LLP in Dallas, Texas, where he
primarily represents employees in individual and collective actions brought nationwide
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
1. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 1 (Aug. 27, 2015)
[hereinafter Browning-Ferris II].
2. The joint-employer standard determines when a company may be held liable as
an employee's "employer," though the company is not the employee's contractual
employer.
3. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1981).
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the decision's authors and has already begun to play out in state
legislatures.4
Although the decision, and its significance, is far from final, it is already
worthy of review. At a minimum, Browning-Ferris II explicitly overturns
decades of NLRB precedent.5 This Article praises the decision's majority
and responds to its dissent. This Article also responds to remarks that were
made at American University Business Law Review's Spring 2015
Symposium ("AU Symposium"), 6 where panelists suggested that this
decision would not only be bad for management but that it would also
damage the "American Dream."
Browning-Ferris H will undoubtedly result in changes for affected
employers, perhaps most immediately through increased legal fees. It will
likely result in several parent companies sitting down at the collective
bargaining table with third-party employees for the first time in decades.
And, it may attract bad press for companies who still resist the notion that
they, too, have a role to play at this expanded table.
In exchange, millions of NLRA-covered workers will have a better
chance of receiving the full benefits of this eighty year-old law. Millions
more workers will benefit from a spillover effect, whereby parent
companies' expanded policies will also function to improve work
conditions for the non-union workers. And, compliant employers will have
a greater chance to compete on a level playing field. These changes are not
only beneficial. They are essential to the American Dream in the 21st
century.
I. THE ECONOMIC REALITY
The economic reality requires a functional joint-employer standard.
Tellingly, in Browning-Ferris II, a fact at issue-whether an email from a
Browning-Ferris agent directing the intermediary human resources
company, Leadpoint, Inc. ("Leadpoint"), to fire an employee-was found
to be sufficient evidence of control. The NLRB Regional Director
("Regional Director") argued that this email was insufficient evidence of
4. For example, a Texas law designed to defeat the decision went into effect on
September 1, 2015. S.B. 652, 84th Leg., (Tex. 2015) (amending § 7 in Chapter 1156).
Note also that the decision had the benefit of an array of amici briefs. Browning-Ferris
II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 7-8.
5. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 16 ("Accordingly, we overrule Laerco,
TLI, A&M Property, and Airborne Express [... ] and other Board decisions, to the
extent that they are inconsistent with our decision today.")
6. Hospitality for the Employee: Where Business, Employment, and the
Hospitality Industry Intersect, American University Business Law Review Spring
Symposium (Mar. 27, 2015).
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"direct control."' Because the firing order was executed by someone other
than the one communicating the instructions, the Regional Director argued
that Browning-Ferris was not legally in control of the situation.
In 2015, workplaces are not only monitored remotely via e-mail and
cameras; they can also be controlled directly through software that dictate a
worker's schedule and tasks, hours of work performed or recorded, and
pay. 8 Beyond this new technological reality, the traditional two-tiered
employer-employee dynamic is now multi-layered. In 2014, a Bureau of
Labor Statistics survey indicated that roughly 2.87 million workers 9
worked for a temporary agency like Leadpoint. Many millions more
worked for franchised businesses. For nearly a decade, the United States
Department of Labor ("DOL"), Wage and Hour Division Administrator
David Weil, has focused on this "fissuring of the employment
relationship." ' 0 Prior to his position with the DOL, Weil studied these
issues as an academic and found that "[r]egardless of motivation, fissuring
in employment relations dramatically complicates the regulation of
workplace conditions."" Applied in the joint-employer context, he noted
[s]uch clear lines of accountability have become murky and establishing
the employer of record in order to assess responsibility has become more
complicated. This creates significant problems for a workplace agency
where foundational statutes like the FLSA assume that most employer-
employee relationships are between easily identified parties.
Consequently, the task of bringing regulatory pressure on the "employer"
has become elusive.12
Recognizing these "changing patterns of industrial life" and that "the
primary function and responsibility of the Board ... is that 'of applying the
7. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 16.
8. See, e.g., McDonald's USA, LLC, a joint employer, et al., NLRB Case No. 02-
CA-093893 (authorizing complaints to proceed against McDonald's under joint-
employer theory because of these practices).
9. See Browning-Ferris H, 362 N.L.R.B. at 11 ("The most recent Bureau of
Labor Statistics survey from 2005 indicated that contingent workers accounted for as
much as 4.1 percent of all employment, or 5.7 million workers. Employment in the
temporary help services industry, a subset of contingent work, grew from 1.1 million to
2.3 million workers from 1990 to 2008. As of August 2014, the number of workers
employed through temporary agencies had climbed to a new high of 2.87 million, a 2
percent share of the nation's work force. Over the same period, temporary employment
also expanded into a much wider range of occupations.")
10. See generally David Weil, Rep. to Dep't of Labor: Wage & Hour Div.,
Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic Enforcement (May 2010),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicenforcement.pdf.
11. Id. at 10 (identifying the "desire to shift labor costs and liabilities to smaller
business entities or to third-party labor intermediaries, such as temporary employment
agencies or labor brokers").
12. Id.
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general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life,"",13 the
NLRB found "reason enough to revisit the Board's current joint-employer
standard."1 4 The Board did not set out to "reshape"' 5 the economic reality;
the dissent itself acknowledged that we have had this complex reality for
some time. Rather, the decision recognized that the NLRB has lagged
behind federal courts, which have interpreted "employment" for many
years under other federal labor and employment laws through a remedial,
realistic, or, minimally, 21 st century lens.
II. THE DECISION
Browning-Ferris H stems from a 2013 election petition by the Teamsters
Union seeking to represent workers at a Browning-Ferris recycling facility
in Milpitas, California. Reaffirming the "traditional" joint-employer
standard from the Third Circuit in Browning-Ferris 116 and relying heavily
on the Supreme Court's precedent that joint-employer status under the
NLRA is an issue of fact for the Board to determine,17 the NLRB
overturned the Regional Director's decision that Browning-Ferris was not a
joint employer of the workers. The NLRB directed the Regional Director
to permit the ballots of the approximately sixty workers in question to
count. In doing so, the Board announced "[r]eserved authority to control
terms and conditions of employment, even if not exercised, is clearly
relevant to the joint-employment inquiry."' 8  Thus, for the first time in
decades, the Board said that factors exhibiting mere "indirect control," and
not just factors exhibiting "direct and immediate control,"' 9 could be
sufficient to support a factual finding of joint employment.
Applying this "traditional" or "indirect control" standard,2 ° the Board
13. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 11 (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)).
14. Id.
15. Contra id. at 23.
16. See generally id. ("Today, we restate the Board's joint-employer standard to
reaffirm the standard articulated by the Third Circuit in Browning-Ferris decision.
Under this standard, the Board may find that two or more statutory employers are joint
employers of the same statutory employees if they 'share or codetermine those matters
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.' In determining whether
a putative joint employer meets this standard, the initial inquiry is whether there is a
common-law employment relationship with the employees in question. If this common-
law employment relationship exists, the inquiry then turns to whether the putative joint
employer possesses sufficient control over employees' essential terms and conditions
of employment to permit meaningful collective bargaining.").
17. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964).
18. Browning-Ferris 11, 362 N.L.R.B. at 2.
19. See, e.g., Airborne Express Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 n.1 (2002).
20. This distinction is immaterial for this discussion but the label depends on
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found that the NLRA applied to the company who, among other factors,
"indirectly"
" Required workers to be drug tested prior to hire and enforced
other eligibility criteria;
" Retained the right to reject workers for "any reason";
* Ordered that specific workers be terminated;
* Determined what tasks workers completed;
* Controlled how quickly workers could perform these tasks;
" Chose where the workers would be stationed;
" Decided workers' schedules and when they were eligible for
overtime; and/or
* Set the ceiling on workers' pay.2'
The Board did not rely on any one factor in particular, but it found that
"all of these forms of control-both direct and indirect-are indicative of
an employer-employee relationship., 22  That is, the human resource
company who merely hired, fired, and paid the workers was not the sole
employer.
By contrast, the dissent would continue to require direct and immediate
control.23  Justifying its opposition, the dissent enumerated a number of
specific concerns. The first three of these concerns are particularly suspect
and are likely what prompted the majority to characterize the dissent as
"long and hyperbolic. '24  The dissent first quipped that the majority's
25decision will force companies to find larger bargaining tables. Second,
the dissent suggested that, because employment relationships have been
layered for over 200 years and since the law has not always adapted to this
reality, the standard should remain unchanged and outdated.26  Still
stretching for logic, the dissent's third contention was that the Board did
not have the authority to modify agency standards. Instead, it argued that
whether one views the decision as anan extension of Browning-Ferris l's "traditional
standard" or a novel, "indirect" standard.
21. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 18-19.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. at 22; see, e.g., Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. at 597 n. 1.
24. Browning-Ferris H, 362 N.L.R.B. at 20.
25. Id. at 21 (Members Miscimarra and Johnson, dissenting) ("First, no bargaining
table is big enough to seat all of the entities that will be potential joint employers under
the majority's new standards."). Here, the dissent also makes the point that the
majority does not have authority for the decision, which is addressed with the dissent's
"third contention."
26. Id. at 22, 35 (noting the decisions the Board overturns were not challenged by
courts of appeal). While this observation is noteworthy, the majority's decision was
not without justification. See supra Part II. Furthermore, the dissent fails to explain
why this lack of a challenge would warrant staying with a dormant standard.
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the common law standard should apply; however, the dissent conceded that
the majority purported to apply the common law as well 27 as standards set
forth in the NLRA. Therefore, the concern is really that the majority
applied improper interpretation, not acted without authority.
III. EMPLOYERS Now FACE A FACT QUESTION
The dissent next criticized the decision for taking the predictability out
of the law by reviving a uniquely 28 dormant legal theory. If this "kind of,
sort of, maybe someday" standard- 29 as it has been called-is upheld,
parent companies will need to consider the possibility that the NLRB could
find that the NLRA applies to the union workers they actually control. For
three decades, these companies have operated at a liability discount. Now,
they may face a question of fact.
The dissent's moment of worker empathy comes in the section where the
dissenters expressed the need to spare employees' confusion.30 Even if it
were true that all workers understand which entity actually "employs"
them, which many likely do not, the more pressing issue is to decide what
kind of predictability is desirable: a standard that is predictable because (a)
it is so narrow that it will only apply to a parent company once every 30
years; or (b) it forces companies to consider that their intermediaries may
not always, under every circumstance, be a fail proof liability shield.
Choice (a) is the obvious choice of the business community, certain state
legislatures, and, as explained below, the decision's dissenters. Choice (b)
27. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 14, 20 ("Today's decision is grounded
firmly in the common law, while advancing the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act. [... ] The common-law definition of an employment relationship
establishes the outer limits of a permissible joint-employer standard under the Act. But
the Board's current joint-employer standard is significantly narrower than the common
law would permit. The result is that employees covered by the Act may be deprived of
their statutory right to bargain effectively over wages, hours, and working conditions,
solely because they work pursuant to an arrangement involving two or more employing
firms, rather than one. Such an outcome seems clearly at odds with the policies of the
Act.").
28. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 22-23 (explaining that other federal acts,
like Title VII and the FLSA have not been applied so narrowly to require "direct" or
"immediate" control).
29. Erin Horton, NLRB Adopts New Joint Employer Test: Companies That Kind of
Sort of Maybe Someday Could Exercise Control over Employees Can Be Joint




30. See e.g., Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 23 ("This confusion and disarray
threatens to cause substantial instability in bargaining relationships, and will result in
substantial burdens, expense, and liability for innumerable parties, including
employee.").
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is the choice required by courts and by law.
The Supreme Court has spoken clearly that "employment" is a case-by-
case basis determination.3' Accordingly, courts apply a broad
interpretation of the employer-employee relationship "to identify
responsible parties without obfuscation by legal fictions applicable in other
contexts." 32 Thus, the Third Circuit found, in Browning-Ferris I,.that "the
question of 'joint employer' status is a factual one and requires an
examination into whether an employer who is claimed to be a 'joint
employer' possessed sufficient control over the work of the employees to
qualify as a 'joint employer' with [the actual employer]. 3 3 In determining
that a judge's role is to assess "sufficient"-and not "direct" or
"immediate"-control, the Third Circuit relied on four decades of NLRB
precedent that interpreted and applied the joint-employer standard under
the NLRA.
Given this established precedent, the majority's claim, that "the
criticisms that our colleagues level at our joint-employer standard could be
made about the concept of joint employment generally - which has been
recognized under the Act for many decades and which has long been a
familiar feature of labor and employment law[,]" has merit. 34 This claim is
true not only for the predictability argument, but it applies to the dissent's
fifth argument with equal force.
IV. MEMBERS OF THE NLRB NEED TO SEE MERIT IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
Fifth, to the extent the majority seeks to correct a perceived inequality of
bargaining leverage resulting from complex business relationships where
some entities are currently nonparticipants in bargaining, the "inequality"
addressed by the majority is the wrong target, and collective bargaining is
the wrong remedy. 35 The dissent continues to say that
the inequality targeted by the new "joint- employer" test is a fixture of
our economy-business entities have diverse relationships with different
interests and leverage that varies in their dealings with one another.
There are contractually "more powerful" business entities and "less
powerful" business entities, and all pursue their own interests.
36
Here, the two sides have a fundamental disagreement over their role on
31. See e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964).
32. Dole v. Simpson, 784 F. Supp. 538, 545 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
33. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1121 (3d Cir. 1982)
(citing Boire, 376 U.S. at 481).
34. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 23.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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the NLRB. The majority stated that "the primary function and
responsibility of the Board ... is that 'of applying the general provisions of
the Act to the complexities of industrial life."' 37 While the dissenters might
persuasively disagree with this function, their role as members of the
NLRB should require that they, at a minimum, seek to advance the
purposes of the NLRA, whatever they might be. "It is not the goal of joint-
employer law to guarantee the freedom of employers to insulate themselves
from their legal responsibility to workers, while maintaining control of the
workplace."
38
As the dissent continues, however, it becomes clear that the dissenters
were not concerned that the decision espouses a policy, exceeding the
bounds of the NLRA; instead, they were concerned that the majority's
decision advances the wrong policy. The majority explained clearly and
consistently that the Board's role was to determine what interpretation best
upheld the NLRA's purpose, 39 which the Board recognized as
"encourag[ing] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining[J,]' 40
and it also cited the Supreme Court's reasoning that "[o]ne of the primary
purposes of the Act is to promote the peaceful settlement of industrial
disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory
influence of negotiation.' In stark contrast, the dissent did not seem to
have space for peaceful negotiation or settlement. The dissent did not
encourage collective bargaining but found peace through silence; it found
that "[r]equiring collective bargaining wherever there is some
interdependence between or among employers is much more likely to
thwart labor peace than advance it."'42 Although there is an inherent tension
between the additional protections that employment laws afford workers
and the costs these protections impose on management, both workers and
management must have a voice in America.
The majority in Browning-Ferris II seeks to amplify workers' voice.
The dissent seemed distracted from the present issues, spending several
43pages attempting to re-litigate other cases, and it ultimately provided a
better defense for the franchise industry than it does for any party present
-Browning-Ferris II did not present a franchise relationship-or under the
NLRA.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id. at21.
39. See e.g., id. at 12.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id. at 12-13 (citing Fireboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964)).
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id. at 26-32.
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V. OTHER CONTEXTS
What is most clear from the decision's dissent is that there is widespread
concern and disagreement about the possible implications this decision
could have. While states are considering-or have passed-laws designed
to countermand the decision, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA") is considering the possibility of a joint-employer
relationship between franchisors and franchisees in regard to workplace
safety maters that would follow the NLRB and its General Counsel's lead.
And, there is precedent for courts to draw on the NLRA's joint-employer
standard when considering the joint-employer standard under a different
labor and employment law.
For example, the Third Circuit relied on Browning-Ferris I when
considering the proper joint-employer standard to apply under the FLSA in
its Enterprise decision At the 2015 AU Symposium, several of my co-
panelists expressed concern that the potential of future cases brought,
alleging joint employment under the FLSA, and not the NLRA, is the true
threat. Browning-Ferris II, however, recognizes that the joint-employment
standard, which now applies under the NLRA, is narrower than under the
FLSA. While the decision catches up to the FLSA, both laws will once
again have space for questions of joint-employment status to be factually
determined; however, it is unlikely that the decision will affect joint-
46employment interpretation under the FLSA. This prediction is
particularly grounded given that, outside of the Third Circuit, federal courts
have been interpreting the FLSA joint-employer standard in isolation from
the NLRA for decades.
Also, while the FLSA has been cited as having the broadest scope of
"employment, ' 47 courts rarely find that the facts are sufficient to hold a
parent company liable. This notion is especially apparent in the franchise
context where parent companies routinely are kept in a case through the
motion to dismiss phase, i.e., they have to join the initial round of talks but
are then released at the summary judgment phase because the facts do not
44. In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 683 F. 3d 462,
468 (3d Cir. 2012).
45. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 17 (explaining that the revised
standard is limited to considerations of control and not broader notions of "economic
realities," which are factors applied in joint-employer doctrine under both the FLSA
and the Agricultural Workers Protection Act).
46. See generally Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 143 (2d
Cir. 2008) (describing joint employment under the FLSA as a fact intensive inquiry);
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (describing whether company
exercised sufficient control under the NLRA to be found a joint employer as a factual
issue).
47. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945).
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warrant a liability determination. 48  Despite this reality that it is very
unlikely that a parent company will remain liable, the joint employment
determination is still a viable legal approach under the FLSA. The same
congressionally recognized rationale that justifies the joint-employer theory
for the FLSA also applies to the NLRA:
This purpose will fail of realization unless the Act has sufficiently broad
coverage to eliminate in large measure from interstate commerce the
competitive advantage accruing from savings in costs based upon
substandard labor conditions. Otherwise the Act will be ineffective, and
will penalize those who practice fair labor standards as against those who
do not.
49
The decision's dissenters and challengers should take note that labor and
employment laws, including the NLRA, exist for the employers' benefit
too.
VI. THE 21 ST CENTURY AMERICAN DREAM
At the AU Symposium, the panel considered briefly what impact the
decision could have on the American Dream. After listening to the
argument that the decision threatened the American Dream because it
would inhibit two young brothers' ability to start a small business early in
life, I made the case for a more dynamic view of the American Dream. My
version of the American Dream exists not only for my twenty-something-
year-old brother to become a small-business owner early in life, but it also
applies to my service-industry-employed sister who makes a living wage,
which she still strives to achieve one hour at a time. It again applies to my
other sister, a soon-to-be college graduate, who is repeatedly offered
unpaid internships as a means to get her "foot in the door" to what might
become a paying job and who also desires to one day earn a living wage.
In a 1987 a congressional hearing considering adjustments to the federal
minimum wage, the American Dream was defined as "independence and
self-reliance achieved through the fruits of one's own labor." 50 For many,
48. See, e.g., Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13CIV5665-LTS-HP, 2014 WL
3512838, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (noting other circuits have generally held that
franchisors are not employers under the FLSA). However, similar to the decision
in Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, the court distinguished those prior cases by noting
that they were all decided after the completion of discovery pursuant to summary
judgment motions and the court here was deciding in the context of a motion to dismiss
prior to the completion of any discovery. Because discovery was not complete and the
pleadings were sufficient, it was inappropriate to dismiss the franchisor at the motions
to dismiss phase). See Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201,
207 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
49. Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 670 (1946).
50. H.R. REP. No. 101-260,pt. 1, at 14(1989).
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this independence and self-reliance is achieved at an hourly wage. While
the decision will undoubtedly increase certain costs for management, its net
effect will be positive. Beyond the union workers who can apply greater
financial pressure to their demands, 5' the decision will benefit non-union
workers who are also jointly-employed by parent companies, whose policy
changes will benefit workers without regard to union status. The decision
will help this responsive employer because "the joint employer doctrine
denies a competitive advantage to those who use substandard labor.,
52
And, companies will begin to be more widely distinguished based on their
labor records, as has occurred with companies' environmental records in
recent years. To the extent that companies choose to be a resistant
employer, the NLRA will now be more capable of forcing employers to be
reputable in their own interest. After Browning-Ferris II, companies have
a clear choice: respond or resist. While the initial inclination might be to
resist, everyone is still better off with viable and enforceable labor and
employment laws.
The 21st century American Dream recognizes that we have arrived at
this economic and technological reality because of the laws that were put
into place eighty years ago and the workers, as well as the innovators, that
got us here. The idea that certain things have improved is not justification
to reduce the legal standards and protections for any American. Browning-
Ferris H is an important decision because it acknowledges that everyone
has a voice and that we can still add more chairs to the table, essential
components of the 21 st century American Dream.
CONCLUSION
Browning-Ferris H is not a perfect decision. As pointed out in the
dissent, it is difficult to imagine how parent companies' NLRA obligations
will be limited only to those terms and conditions they are deemed to
control.5  Regardless, the decision is, on the whole, a step in the right
direction.
If the decision is upheld, the NLRA has a greater likelihood of achieving
its purpose, and millions of Americans stand to benefit. While there will be
a financial burden imposed on certain employers, the initial costs will be
absorbed, and the incentives to layer employment relationships will persist
and evolve. Parent companies will still control virtually every aspect of
their employment or contractual relationships. If these companies are
51. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 28 (2015) (reaching into the
parent company's "deeper pockets" and increasing costs).
52. Richard J. Burch, A Practitioner's Guide to Joint Employer Liability Under the
FLSA, 2 Hous. Bus. & TAX L. J. 393, 405 (2002).
53. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. at 42
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concerned with these relationships that put them at risk under the NLRA,
they can terminate the relationships, can further indemnify themselves, and
can even choose to be better for their workers and their brand.
